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Two powerful and contradictory intuitions 
govern ~ priori reflections on whether natural 
languages contain finitely or infinitely many 
sentences The first of these is connected with 
the criterion that a sentence of a natural language 
be recognizable as such by a native speaker Simple 
considerations connected with the finiteness of 
human capacities and ultimately of human life 
insistently suggest that the number of sentences of 
a natural language, though undoubtedly very large, 
must be finite 
This point is made rather pungently in 
Olmstead 1967 (304), "The assumption that English 
sentences are not always less than a million words 
in length smells of the computer center rather than 
of the field situation " Even if the native 
speaker of our natural language were possessed of 
a monumental memory and were heroically loquacious, 
it hardly makes sense to speak of him as uttering or 
recognizing sentences of such stupendous length 
This unless he were idealized to such an extent as 
to equip him for conversation only with God 
On the other hand, the existence of recursive 
grammatical constructions in natural languages 
leads one to the opposite conclusion For if there 
were only finitely many sentences of a natural 
language, then there must be one of maximal length 
Applying such a construction to this sentence would 
then produce a still longer sentence Hence the 
number of sentences in a natural language is 
infinite 
This intuition is rather clearly expressed in 
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Grinder and Elgin 1973 (24) 
•• while any particular sentence of English 
is finite in length, the set of all well-
forrn.ed sentences in English is infinite. 
There can be no "longest possible sentence " 
To any given sequence constituting a 
grammatical English sentence, you can add 
another relative clause, and no natural 
linu t can be set at which such structures 
become incomprehensible 
The aim of what follows is to show that 
considerations of the sort JUSt mentioned are 
specious My method of attack will consist in 
showing the close similarities between the 
recursiveness argument and an important logical 
paradox 
There are many different ways in which the 
paradox I am concerned to expose may be formulated 
It can in particular be formulated for virtually 
any concrete empirical predicate which admits of 
a class of clear instances and also of a class of 
clear counterinstances I have selected the 
predicate 'is poor' primarily for reasons of 
technical convenience. 
Consider the following argument 
(Al) (Pl) An American family with a yearly income 
of only 10 dollars is poor 
(Px) For any x, if an American fanuly with 
a yearly income of only x dollars is poor, 
then an American fanuly with a yearly income 
of only x+5 dollars is poor Therefore, 
(Cl) An American family with a yearly income 
of only 15 dollars is poor 
I am presunung it to be uncontroversial that 
(Pl) is in fact true To be sure, one could imagine 
bizarre circumstances in which (Pl) nught fail to 
hold completely invariably But I am supposing that 
such unusual circumstances do not in fact obtain 
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There is even less difficulty in accepting (Px) as 
true, since it amounts merely to the claim that enrich-
ing a poor family by five dollars will not remove them 
from their poverty Five dollars is too small a sum to 
make enough of a difference to remove a family from the 
class of poor families and firmly establish them in the 
class of the non-poor 
Next, according to the principles of modern 
quatifier logic (and the additional tacit prenu.ss 
'10+5=15'), argument (Al) is valid if its premisses 
are true then its conclusion cannot be false Since its 
premisses are in fact obviously true, we are committed 
by modern logic to the truth of (Cl) And we see in 
this case that (Cl) is in fact also true 
Suppose we now make conclusion (Cl) the first 
premiss of a new argument (A2) 
(A2) (P2) An American family with a yearly income 
of only 15 dollars is poor 
(Px) For any x, if an American family with a 
yearly income of only x dollars is poor, then 
an American family with a yearly income of 
only x+S dollars is poor Therefore, (C2) 
An American family with a yearly income of only 
20 dollars is poor 
Exactly the same reflections appropriate to argu-
ment (Al) continue to apply to argument (A2) Addi-
tionally, however, we note that the truth of (P2) is 
guaranteed by virtue of its having been the conclusion 
of argument (Al), and so we have the stronger result 
which is expressed by argument (A2 ) 
(A2') (Pl) An American family with a yearly income 
of only 10 dollars is poor 
(Px) For any x, if an American family with a 
yearly income of only x dollars is poor, then 
an American family with a yearly income of 
only x+S dollars is poor Therefore, (C2) 
An American family with a yearly income of only 
20 dollars is poor 
LOGICAL PARADOX AND THE FINITENESS OF NATURAL LANGUAGE 491 
But now the paradox arises. For there is nothing 
to prevent us from continuing to construct a long list 
of arguments, using a computer or a bevy of graduate 
students if need be, which includes such arguments as 
(A998*) and (A3998*). 
(A998*) (Pl) An American family with a yearly income 
of only 10 dollars is poor. 
(Px) For any x, if an American family with a 
yearly income of only x dollars is poor, then 
an American family with a yearly income of 
only x+5 dollars is poor Therefore, (C998) 
An American family with a yearly income of 
only 5000 dollars is poor 
(A3998*) (Pl). (Px) Therefore, 
(C3998) An American family with a yearly in-
come of only 20000 dollars is poor 
But here we are obviously in trouble For (C3998) 
is surely false. And yet the validity of each argument 
in the series guarantees the truth of each conclusion, 
and hence the truth of (C3998) 
Notice incidentally that none of the arguments is 
excessively long That is, we are not faced here with 
the problem of requiring that the arguments in the series 
contain premisses of indefinite length If we were to 
continue the series of arguments indefinitely, though, 
this problem might well arise, since the numerals in 
the premisses and conclusions would become excessively 
long 
This paradox may not be lightly dismissed For 
surely the principles of logic must not become suspect 
merely because applied too often And if argument (Al) 
is valid, then argument (A3998*) is also valid, since 
each of the previous arguments in the series is valid. 
If we reJect the reasoning which has led us to (C3998), 
then we must be able to explain where the reasoning 
breaks down, and why The force of the paradox is 
that it seems impossible to point the finger of blame 
at any one of the arguments in the series. 
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Solving the paradox by reJecting either premiss 
(Pl) or (Px) is of course something which is open to us 
But these premisses are obviously true, and I doubt 
whether it would occur to anyone to doubt them were it 
not for the fact that they lead us to the false conclu-
sion (C3998) 
I wish now to set out what seems to me to be the 
most coherent solution to the paradox It would be 
wrong to dismiss out of hand other proposed solutions, 
the great thing about a good paradox is that it opens 
up various lines of inquiry for tracing precisely what 
are the hidden premisses of a piece of reasoning A 
really good paradox, such as I think ours is, fascinates 
us because the hidden premisses are so well hidden and 
so few 
Although modern quantifier logic requires very 
little of the arguments to which it is to be applied, 
it does make several stipulations or requirements The 
two most important of these may be expressed as the 
requirements of bivalence and non-contradiction 
The requirement of non-contradiction is that the 
sentences to which logical theory is applied may not be 
both true and false This requirement does not play a 
role in the paradox 
The requirement of bivalence is that the sentences 
to which logical theory is d are to be either 
true or false It is not modern logic assumes 
that every declarative sentence is either true or false 
It is Just that modern quantifier logic has little to 
say about arguments constructed from sentences which 
fail to satisfy the bivalence requirement 
The bivalence requirement is normally taken for 
granted, due in part to the desire of logicians to deal 
with the form of sentences as abstracted from the con-
crete circumstances of their use Normally, that is, 
all that a logician will require is that the arguments 
he examines be composed of sentences having a trans-
parent logical structure 
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The arguments in the paradox have a sufficiently 
transparent logical structure to make the validity of 
their common form quite evident And under normal 
circumstances the logical form is all that matters 
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But the paradox reveals that more than the form of the 
arguments is at issue 
Modern logic does guarantee that none of the 
separate arguments (Al)-(A3998) permits us to pass 
from true premisses to a false conclusion But it does 
not rule out the possibility that we may pass from true 
premisses to an indeterIIU.nate conclusion, that is, a 
conclusion which is neither true nor false, or from 
premisses one of which is indeterIIU.nate to a false 
conclusion And this is, I would suggest, precisely 
what has happened during the series of arguments Some-
where in the region of (A998) the conclusions have 
become indeterminate 
As a result, the argument (A3998*) may well be 
expected to have true preIIU.sses and a false conclusion, 
since by transitivity of entailment the indeterIIU.nate 
conclusions have all dropped out Only an underlying 
presumption that all of the sentences under considera-
tion are either true or false has led to the expectation 
that all of the conclusions must be true 
The most common source of failure of a sentence 
to satisfy the bivalence requirement is the application 
of an empirical predicate to a borderline case It has 
become a philosophical truism to observe that empirical 
predicates do not have sharp boundaries Normally 
there are some cases to which it clearly applies, some 
cases to which it clearly does not apply, and a region 
of borderline cases to which it neither clearly applies 
nor clearly does not apply And the most coherent inter-
pretation of sentences which result from applying an 
empirical predicate, such as 'is poor', to a borderline 
case is I would suggest to treat them as neither true 
nor false, and thus as failing to satisfy the bivalence 
requirement 
It should be noted that one seldom is able to say 
precisely where the borderline cases begin It seems 
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clear enough to me, for example, that (C998) is neither 
true nor false Yet I am not prepared to say Just 
where the cases become borderline An attempt to be 
more precise will often result in a rather arbitrary 
stipulation, such as a guideline laid down by the 
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare 
If the empirical predicate in question is made 
sharp, then paradox is avoided in another way, namely, 
by observing that for such predicates the second premiss 
(Px) is false Indeed, I think it is clear that it is 
precisely the existence of indeterminate cases which 
guarantees the plausible truth of (Px) A strict 
definition of poverty, such as 'having a yearly income 
of less than 5000 dollars', does make it possible some-
times for five dollars to remove a family from poverty, 
no doubt to their dismay 
Being unable to say precisely where the indeter-
minate cases begin and end must not blind us to their 
existence For an inability to take account of border-
line cases may lead us into a very common fallacy, 
which might be called the Where do you draw the line 
fallacy Noticing correctly thatthere--rs-no sharp 
distinction between cases of poverty and cases of non-
poverty, but rather a continuous blending of the one 
into the other through an indeterminate region, we may 
if we are not careful fall into the trap of concluding 
that there is no difference between the two conditions 
Similarly, our inability in general to say 
precisely which straw made the camel's burden too heavy 
to bear should not lead us to conclude that it could 
bear any burden A poignant image for us to respect 
in this regard may be derived from Truffaut's great 
film, The 400 Blows There is no single point in the 
film where the young boy has been in]ured too badly to 
recover, but he has clearly suffered irreversible damage 
at the end 
Although the point to be made against the recursive-
ness argument is probably clear enough by now, I shall 
nevertheless spell it out in order to make sure 
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The recursiveness argument can be rephrased in such 
a way that its being an instance of the paradox under 
discussion is made evident For consider the following 
argument 
(Arl) (Prl) There is an English sentence containing 
10 words. 
(Prx) For any x, if there is an English sentence 
containing x words, then there is an English 
sentence containing x+5 words. Therefore, 
(Crl) There is an English sentence containing 
15 words 
Premiss (Prl) is obviously true. Premiss (Prx) is 
also clearly true, if one takes into account, for example, 
the prefixing of the words 'It is not true that' to any 
English sentence The conclusion (Crl) is logically 
entailed by the premisses, and it is also obviously true. 
We can now reconstruct the paradox, leading us 
successively to such conclusions as 
(Cr998) There is an English sentence containing 5000 
words. 
(Cr3998) There is an English sentence containing 20000 
words. 
(Crl99998) There is an English sentence containing 
1000000 words 
But now we are not compelled by logical grounds 
alone to the truth of (Crl99998) For now we under-
stand what we may demand, namely, assurance that the 
sentences composing the arguments all satisfy the bi-
valence requirement. That is, we are not being 
irrational in assenting to the truth of (Prl) and (Prx) 
and yet questioning the truth of (Crl99998) or even 
(Cr3998). For as we have seen, this method of chaining 
arguments is paradoxical 
Of course to say that the reasoning Just illus-
trated is paradoxical does not mean that the conclusions 
need be false Our assurance that (Crl99998), for 
example, is false must rest on independent grounds. 
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I do think, however, that the considerations 
mentioned as the first intuition are compellingly 
persuasive regarding the finiteness of natural 
language, providing only that 'is a sentence of a 
natural language' is being used in an empirical sense 
And there is some evidence that linguists whose 
theories appear to commit them to the existence of 
infinitely many sentences of natural language are 
sensitive to this point I would note for example 
the distinction drawn in Bach 1974 (25) between the 
infinitely many grammatical sentences of English as 
opposed to the finitely many sentences of 
English 
Although I would quarrel with Bach's grounds for 
making his distinction, I find no fault with his con-
clusion, which I take to be that there need be no 
exact fit between an abstract theory and the empirical 
domain to which it is intended to be applied In 
particular, the abstract theory may well concern an 
infinite domain 
At the risk of simplifying the formal linguist's 
task beyond all recognition, let me attempt to 
explain a bit the point JUSt raised Suppose 
following Quine 1961 (54), we take the task the 
formal linguist to be to construct a purely formal 
device which generates precisely the sentences of 
English Reasons of theoretical economy may well 
lead him to produce an infinitely large set S But 
this will not matter very much, as long as S corre-
sponds reasonably well to the examined sentences of 
English For problems of applying the theory to 
sequences of unmanageable length are by hypothesis not 
going to arise 
What I have tried to show is that the puzzle con-
cerning the finiteness or otherwise of natural language 
is not grounded in special considerations involving 
only linguists It is JUSt one manifestation of a 
logical paradox which may pop up almost anywhere 
Where the presumption of bivalence obtains, as in 
arithmetic, we may take a proof of the claim 
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(1) There is no largest prime. 
to be equivalent to the claim 
( 2) TheFe are infinitely many primes 
This is so because the series of arguments constituting 
the paradox may not pass from true premisses to a false 
conclusion, and since the only alternative to being 
false is being true, the arguments all have true 
conclusions 
But in a domain where bivalence may not be presumed, 
as in any empirical domain, presumably including 
linguistics, the claim 
(3) There is no longest English sentence 
is not strictly equivalent to the claim 
(4) There are infinitely many English sentences. 
For here the series of arguments constituting the 
paradox may pass from true premisses to conclusions 
which are neither true nor false, and from these to 
conclusions which are false. 
We may if we wish coherently avoid identifying 
sentences (3) and (4) on the analogy of the natural 
equivalence between sentences (1) and (2) We may even 
assert, as I believe to be the case, that sentence (3) 
is true and sentence (4) is false 
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